



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
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)


Political Developments in South Vietnam: Public agitation continued this weekend, with increasing anti-American overtones in I Corps and the first street demonstration in Saigon. The military government, meanwhile, is trying to win agreement among civilian elements to its compromise plan to speed up the transition to civilian rule.

According to the US Embassy, military officials are sounding out political and religious leaders, and the plan will be formally announced in a few days if a consensus can be reached. Militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang has been approached, but government officials doubt that he will support the plan. They are apparently having more success with moderate Tam Chau, chairman of the Buddhist Institute. Yesterday, Chau publicly urged his followers to allow the government to fulfill its promises.

Chau's statement seems to have had a moderating effect on some of Saigon's Buddhist students, who yesterday debated whether to continue demonstrations. Most of the students apparently decided to go along with Chau's appeal, although the embassy reports that the more militant ones can be expected to attempt further street demonstrations.

One small demonstration had occurred in Saigon the previous evening following a meeting at the Buddhist Institute. About a thousand persons marched into the central market place but then gradually drifted away without any incidents of violence. Police did not interfere.

In I Corps, meanwhile, antigovernment activity and influence remained unchecked over the weekend. In Hue,



an apology by the senior US military adviser to local student leaders at least temporarily resolved a potentially serious incident created on 26 March when US Marines removed several anti-American, English-language placards near the university campus. The local "struggle committee" later broadcast an open telegram of protest to President Johnson and announced that a rally would be held at some future date to discuss the incident.

Other recent antigovernment radiobroadcasts in Hue have included attacks on Ambassador Lodge and a critical review of US political commitments in Vietnam. One radio communique stated that concessions promised by the central government are only "a plot to weaken the spirit of the people." Yesterday, a procession of some 20,000 persons, including 1,000 uniformed military personnel, was held in Hue. Antigovernment banners were evident, but the procession was orderly.

The US Embassy reports that Saigon government leaders intend to maintain their "wait and see" policy toward the agitation in I Corps for a few more days. Embassy officials feel, however, that if the situation continues much longer, the restoration of government authority there will become much more difficult.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: There were no reports of significant developments in allied operations in progress this weekend. On 26 March, enemy forces attacked small government outposts in Vinh Long and Bac Lieu provinces, resulting in moderate government casualties. A larger attack the same day by an estimated battalion of Viet Cong against an outpost in western Quang Duc Province was successfully repulsed.

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Indonesia: The newly revised Indonesian cabinet represents a compromise between President Sukarno and army leader Suharto, but the army and its civilian advisers are expected to play the dominant role.

The cabinet appears to consist chiefly of moderates, with a number of army officers receiving appointments. The first deputy premier and chairman of the new six-man ruling inner cabinet or presidium is Johannes Leimena. [He is a weak personality chosen when Sukarno adamantly resisted having a strong anti-Communist in the position.]

The selection of Idham Chalid as second deputy premier ad interim for supreme state agencies' affairs appears to be a concession to both Sukarno and the Nahdatul Ulama, Indonesia's large Moslem party.

General Suharto was appointed temporarily as fifth deputy premier for defense and security affairs and presumably will continue to be the driving force in the new government. General Nasution returns to government as deputy supreme commander of KOGAM, the "crush Malaysia" command, with ministerial rank.



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Pakistan: [In talking to the US ambassador, President Ayub has tried to play down the current visit of Chinese Communist chief of state Liu Shao-chi.]

[Ayub told Ambassador McConaughy that Liu's visit was scheduled some months ago and was not intended to coincide with Indira Gandhi's trip to the US. He insisted that since Liu's trip included visits to other neighboring countries it could not have been rescheduled, even though Ayub realized that the coincidence in timing might be misrepresented.]

[Ayub stated that he did not intend to allow the Chinese to use the visit as a platform from which to attack the US. The public statements made thus far have generally been the standard expressions of peace and friendship. Nevertheless, Liu did refer in a formal banquet speech to "US aggression against Vietnam."]

[The Pakistani President also told McConaughy that an enthusiastic public welcome was to be expected because of Chinese gestures of support for Pakistan during the conflict with India last September. An embassy report has described the crowds which lined Liu's procession route as the largest for any state visit in the last three years.]

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
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Cyprus: [President Makarios and the Greek Government are at odds over who will control the Cyprus armed forces.]

[Makarios is trying to put a man of his own choice in charge of the Cypriot national guard, the principal domestic security force. Such an arrangement would relegate the commander in chief of the armed forces, General Grivas, to the role of a coordinator with little command authority.]

[Greek supporters of Grivas predict dire consequences for the Stephanopoulos government in Athens, as well as for the cause of enosis, if it permits Makarios to win out. The outcome is still uncertain, but Makarios will probably obtain some degree of control over the national guard.]

[Meanwhile, Turkish military and naval units on the southwest coast of Turkey are engaged in unusually large exercises coinciding with the semiannual rotation of part of the 650-man Turkish military contingent on the island. Although Greek Cypriot authorities apparently are haggling over supplies to be brought in by the new unit, Makarios is not expected to attempt to block the rotation.]



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NOTES

Rumania: The Rumanian party is sending a strong delegation to the CPSU 23rd Party Congress, but still seems determined to demonstrate its independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In an apparent effort to counterbalance the 18 March visit to Bucharest by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, the Rumanians pointedly announced on 21 and 23 March that party leaders had also held private talks with the newly appointed Chinese ambassador.

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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